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FOREWORD
There is much discussion throughout the U.S.
national security and foreign policy communities
about the complexities and challenges of the IndoAsia-Pacific as our Nation increases its strategic focus on this important region. In fact, there is already
an abundance of think-tank generated forecasts and
strategic net assessments focusing on China’s military
modernization, its competitive territorial and power
pursuits, and the strategies and technologies that
will be necessary to counter its growing anti-access/
area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. While China is the
prominent player in the region, it is only one piece of
a highly complex and dynamic strategic puzzle. There
are a myriad of regional and global dynamics at play.
These formidable forces—piracy, human trafficking,
terrorism, natural disasters, territorial disputes, and a
growing dissatisfaction with the current world order,
among others—present distinct and often overlapping challenges to regional and global security and
stability. Yet, they also provide unique opportunities
for enhanced collaboration and understanding.
The following strategic assessment seeks to go
beyond a traditional comparative analysis of the military, technological, political, cultural, and economic
factors governing the relationships and capabilities of
the Asia Pacific environment. To truly make sense of
the intrinsic complexities unique to this region, the authors endeavor to broaden our view and rely on a tool
often overlooked in government studies: imagination.
Moreover, they aim to offer a strategic document that
is readable, instructive, and provocative. Pulling from
a well-referenced piece of military teaching, this as-

vii

sessment borrows a learning concept first employed
in 1904 by Major General Sir Ernest Dunlop Swinton
in The Defence of Duffer’s Drift. Widely read today
among our military’s ground forces, this fictional story describes the plight of young Lieutenant Backsight
Forethought as he commands a 50-man platoon tasked
to hold a tactically critical piece of land called Duffer’s Drift. The story unfolds in a series of six dreams,
where the blunders of the unwitting lieutenant lead
to disaster. As the dreams progress, he harnesses the
lessons of each of his failures, and by applying these
lessons, his platoon ultimately defends Duffer’s Drift.
While Sir Ernest Dunlop Swinton’s book was originally penned to instruct tactical concepts, the piece is
a powerful primer for strategic and operational thinking. The successful defense of Duffer’s Drift required
the nuanced application of hard-earned knowledge;
ignoring even one tactical lesson guaranteed certain
defeat. Applying this narrative concept to a contemporary and strategic setting, the authors borrow a page
from this tactical playbook, and offer a 21st century
account of “Duffer’s Shoal: A Strategic Dream of the
Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of Responsibility
(AOR).” Employing a series of fictional “dreams” that
explore many of the competing forces and dynamics pertinent to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, our 21st
century protagonist will take us through six distinct
misadventures to illustrate and consider key strategic
level lessons and insights.
To account for the prevailing challenges and the
complex nature of modern strategic conflict, the central character in our narrative is a colonel newly assigned to the Commander’s Action Group (CAG), at
U.S. PACOM. A recent U.S. Army War College gradu-
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ate, Colonel Carlisle “Maestro” Prudence begins his
fictional plight on his way to report to PACOM’s
Headquarters at Camp Smith, Hawaii. Fatigued by
the last few days of household goods pack-out and
garrison out-processing, he succumbs to slumber as
his plane’s doors are secured for departure. Anxious
to begin his new assignment, Colonel Prudence’s
dreams instinctively race through the diverse strategic and operational level planning efforts he could
be tasked with for supporting such a vast and vital
region. Beginning with his first dream about steady
state planning and continuing through escalating levels of conflict intensity, Colonel Prudence’s “success”
will require the judicious application of the strategic
lessons he has learned—and will yet learn. Similar to
Lieutenant Foresight’s tactical progression, Colonel
Prudence’s ultimate strategic “success” will hinge on
his ability to appreciate and leverage all of the instruments of national power, recognizing and anticipating
both desired and undesired consequences, and perhaps most importantly—having the strategic patience
to understand and appreciate the region’s complex
and dynamic environment.
While the structure of this analysis is inspired by
Sir Ernest Dunlop Swinton’s work, the tactical defense
of a drift is infinitely less complex than the strategic
environment of the PACOM AOR. Thus, Colonel
Prudence’s dreams are strategically diverse, and by
necessity, more imaginative. By crafting these hypothetical narratives—by harnessing the power of the
story—the authors seek to advance a deeper appreciation of the complexities in the region and illustrate
the convergence of these complexities with our own
national interests. Significantly, these six U.S. Army
War College scholars hope to incite a richer dialogue
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about our Nation’s strategic approach to this vital region and challenge our definitions of strategic success.
By sharing these pragmatic stories, they endeavor to
inspire a better way.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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DUFFER’S SHOAL:
A STRATEGIC DREAM
OF THE PACIFIC COMMAND
AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
FIRST DREAM
An Early Appreciation.
Weary from the preceding days of out-processing
and hectic pack out from Carlisle Barracks, I surrendered to a deep sleep as soon as the plane’s doors were
secured for departure. The soft whine of the aircraft’s
engines was like a gentle lullaby, beckoning me to a
long slumber.
Suddenly, I found myself seated at a large rectangular conference table, encircled by the familiar black,
high-backed rolling chairs ubiquitous to U.S. military
conference rooms around the globe. I silently wondered if these widely distributed U.S. Government furniture staples had been produced in Chinese factories.
A quick survey of the Pacific Command (PACOM)logoed coffee cup clutched in my right hand confirmed
the anticipated “Made In China” stamping.

Picture 1. “Made in China.”
1

My thoughts abruptly returned to the task at hand,
as the PACOM Commander entered the room. After retaking my seat, I began to brief the Commander on the
initial operational design we recently produced within the Command Action Group (CAG) here at Camp
Smith, Hawaii. Our focus was on PACOM’s Area of
Responsibility (AOR) and U.S. national interests in the
region. This morning’s out-brief marked the culmination of 3 weeks of dedicated design and (optimistically)
the transition from the Iraq/Afghanistan focus of the
previous decade to the more conventional planning
process inherent to our steady state military operations,
exercises, and security cooperation assistance programs
throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
As I progressed through my well-rehearsed PowerPoint slides, I outlined key findings of our design work
and highlighted the shared logic that shaped our emerging viewpoints. At its core, our framing of the PACOM
AOR had revealed a very complex geopolitical system
with numerous internal and external dynamics and
actors at play. The primary drivers of this system appeared to be the ongoing strategic competition between
the United States and China, and the continued bifurcation of regional and global actors between the two
national powers. Notably, our group had deduced that
respective nation-states and actors in the Indo-Asia-Pacific “system” would predictably dance between both
camps, seemingly siding with a respective power when
it benefited their individual interests. The United States
typically emerged as the desired partner when it came
to security interests; China was the preferred choice
when the stakes were financial. The dynamic interplay
of these changing alliances and partnerships could be
likened to a basic weighing scale, with the balance of
power shifting by issue and interest. Conspicuously,
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the scale of influence had tipped decidedly in China’s
favor in recent years.
I paused to take a sip of my coffee, allowing the
Commander an opportunity to provide feedback. She
seemed intrigued by our initial understanding of the
environment. After a brief moment, the Commander
inquired about the current U.S. strategic approach
to the region, and the impact our recent policy pivot
was having on this delicate competitive balance. The
Commander wondered aloud if this strategic orientation came with undesired consequences, and if this approach furthered a detrimental, Cold War-like power
struggle in the region. Did our current national strategy mistakenly advance a zero sum game with China?
What was the optimal U.S. approach?
Before I could respond, my CAG colleague jumped
in with a passionate reply. These very questions had
dominated a good portion of our group discussion
throughout the design, and represented our chief takeaways from 3 weeks of effort. As my colleague relayed,
our review had suggested that the pursuit of equal influence—or worse, yet—a balance decidedly favored
toward the United States was, in fact, undesirable. Such
pursuits by the United States would inevitably provoke
a counterbalance by China, leading to greater instability and bifurcation in the region. China’s predictable
response to the U.S. provocative pursuit of exclusionary trade agreements, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP), and development of the U.S. military’s Air-Sea
Battle are cases in point. In short, the competitive balance being played out between the United States and
China did not lend itself well to Cold War thinking.
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“What about multilateral organizations, like the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC]?” asked
the Commander. “Is it possible for the United States
to more effectively engage with China and our regional partners through these forums? What about the
progress recently made at the November 2014 APEC
Summit?”1
These were particularly vexing questions to answer.
From our review, it was apparent that China preferred
interacting with regional nations on a bilateral, one-onone basis. We surmised that this preference stemmed
from China’s ability to control more effectively such
engagements. If China meaningfully participated in
multilateral settings, it was typically in alliances that
China itself had spearheaded and in which the United
States was not a member. China’s aggressive promotion of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
(the BRICS countries) collaboration and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) were examples of two
such multilateral partnerships aimed at challenging
U.S. global leadership.2
Further, we determined that China’s underlying
distrust of the existing international order—and its
belief that the current order unfairly favors the United
States—would make China’s substantive participation
in any organizations advanced by the United States unlikely. This would particularly be the case as long as
China perceived the United States as a deliberate competitor, directly challenging its national interests. At
best, the United States could try to incentivize China
to play by existing international norms and rules, and
attempt to make the costs of not playing by the rules
undesirable. This optimal course of action would only
be attainable if existing organizations were modified to
acknowledge and account for China’s interests.
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The Commander reflected on our assessment, and
then questioned the impact of China’s recent overtures to Russia. “Despite a history of rivalry,” the
Commander explained, “the last few years have seen
a marked improvement in Russian-Chinese relations,
culminating in the historic 30-year, $456 billion energy
deal reached between the two nations in May 2014.3
How would you characterize the current relationship
between these two powers, and what is the potential impact of this emerging strategic partnership on
U.S. interests? What leverage does the United States
have with China, given the continued development
and influence of these alternate alliances and
organizations?”
I felt my cheeks turning pink. Naively, we had assumed Russia was principally a European Command
(EUCOM), vice PACOM, concern. Sheepishly admitting our error to the Commander, I confessed: “Ma’am,
we did not consider China’s bilateral relationship with
Russia in our assessment. We will go back to the white
board and reframe our understanding.” Silence. I hated
uncomfortable silence in a briefing with the Commander. After a curt nod, the Commander proceeded by asking our assessment of the September 2014 agreement
by SCO members to increase their membership by four
nations. Momentously, China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan had agreed to
add India, Pakistan, Iran, and Mongolia to their group.4
Did these SCO additions signal an expansion of the organization’s focus? Moreover, with inclusion of these
formidable nations, was the SCO emerging as a viable
regional security and economic counterweight?5
My colleague hastily handed me an article from
yesterday’s news clips. Quickly skimming the highlighted portions, my eyes jumped to recent remarks
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attributed to Russian professor Aleksey Maslov, chair
of the Department of Asian Studies at the Higher School
of Economics in Moscow. “At present,” Maslov surmised, “the SCO has started to counterbalance NATO’s
role in Asia.”6 The article proceeded with an account
of how “the aggressive nature of Western actions towards Russia has certainly united the SCO members,”
and that “[t]he SCO, like the BRICS with their Development Bank, sees itself as a forum against the Western
dominated global order.”7
Trying to summarize expeditiously the article’s key
insights, I attributed the recent SCO expansion to China’s larger pursuit of global influence and the creation
of an alternate world order. Internally, I also wondered
about the broader implications of these growing alliances and the criticality of our adding a robust understanding of Russia—and China’s pursuit globally—into our
strategic thinking. Could U.S. and European attempts
to isolate Russia, through economic sanctions and diplomatic rebukes, ultimately push Russia closer toward
China? Would such an outcome prove more perilous in
the long run than Russia’s bellicose actions in Eastern
Europe? Specifically, would a growing China-Russia
partnership lead to the sale of more advanced Russian weaponry to Chinese forces? Equally troubling,
what would the addition of a country like Iran to the
SCO partnership mean to our efforts in the Middle
East? The dangers of overlooking and misunderstanding the complex factors and relationships at play were
undeniably profound.
After receiving the signal from the Chief of Staff
to wrap up my brief, I promptly advanced to my final
slide and awkwardly asked the Commander if she had
any remaining questions or concerns. After another
pause, the Commander looked around the room and
asked me to list the specific participants of our de6

sign effort. I dutifully named each and every member
of our team, breathing a sigh of relief for a seemingly
simple inquiry.
The Commander’s follow-up question caught me
completely by surprise. With audible frustration in her
voice, she asked what interagency and international
partners we included in our design. I stumbled to come
up with a suitable response. Certainly, the Commander
understood that we only had access to PACOM staff for
this design effort, and the limited number of interagency civilians assigned to the headquarters precluded
their meaningful participation. The inclusion of any international representation would have proven further
futile, given geographic realities, funding constraints,
and security clearance concerns. Even the 45-minute
video teleconference we had conducted with the U.S.
State Department desk officers back at Foggy Bottom
had proven to be a logistical nightmare due to time
differences and incompatible agency network links.
As I searched for reasonable justifications, it struck
me that our understanding was perilously incomplete
without having the right expertise in the room. Similar
to the mistaken exclusion of Russia as a key external
actor in our regional assessment, our analysis lacked
critical civilian and global perspective. Perspectives
that would arguably have enabled a more complete
understanding of the complex adaptive system that
is the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. A renewed look at our
polished slides quickly reinforced that our efforts were
understandably biased toward a U.S. military, and
specifically PACOM, viewpoint.
I closed my eyes, briefly, wishing a do-over with
the Commander. Many of the valuable insights our
CAG had advanced were obscured by our avoidable stumbles. Replaying the lessons learned, I
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prioritized the following strategic takeaways for follow
on planning.
Reflections.
1. Apply systemic thinking to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the environment. This can help
identify potential consequences of our action (or inaction) and is vital for both steady state and contingency
planning.
2. Collaborate early and often with interagency,
international, and nongovernmental partners, particularly when seeking to understand and engage in a
complex, adaptive environment like the PACOM AOR.
While the costs and hurdles of securing such cooperation may be challenging, the price of incomplete and
erroneous understandings is far greater.
3. Pursue complementary solutions. Zero sum,
competitive approaches to U.S. foreign policy in the
PACOM AOR have unintended and perilous consequences, both within the region and worldwide. Such
approaches often educe undesirable military escalation and bring about unproductive competition in
the region.
SECOND DREAM
Of Fish and Pirates.
At once, I noticed a change around me. The distinct
smell of the sea and the sound of the tide lapping slowly
against wood jerked me back into consciousness. As I
surveyed the area, I was not sure exactly where I stood,
but I did realize I was standing on an old wooden dock.
The smell of rotting wood and dead fish quickly overcame the fragrance of the salt air. As I struggled to gain
8

my bearings, I began to look at the markings of the
boats in the harbor, and listened to the locals speaking
to each other as they conducted their routine business.
After a few minutes, I concluded that I stood on the
dock of Hai Phong Harbor in Vietnam.
The workday seemed to be ending as I watched
fishing boats return to the harbor with conspicuously
empty nets. The captains and crews were noticeably
disheartened as they unloaded their gear, pointing at
the nets, heads bowed in disappointment, while speaking to each other in hushed tones. I thought back to my
understanding of the importance of fishing in this part
of the world, and immediately realized the predicament around me.

Picture by Lucas Jans.

Picture 2. Vietnamese Fishing Boat.
Overfishing, the exploitation of the fishing areas
by industrial fishing companies, and decades of dynamite and cyanide fishing practices by countries in the
region finally took the predicted toll on the maricul-
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ture industry.8 With the destruction of so many of the
coral reefs and the over-exploitation of the viable fishing areas, the fishing industry in the South China Sea
(SCS) ceased to be economically sustainable. With the
fish previously available annually to local fishermen
decimated and surviving schools migrating to new
areas with abundant coral reefs, an economic collapse
became imminent. Even in the disputed waters, China
had pursued aggressive fishing for many years, leaving
nothing in the area untouched. This loss of income and
food source for the countries in the area took a heavy
toll, leaving fishermen without an income to provide
for their families.9
I sought out my local colleague, eager to gain a
more thorough understanding of the problem and possible backlash. Duong Pham requested I return to our
hotel while he spoke to the local fisherman. My presence would surely prevent them from telling the whole
story. I returned to my lodging and awaited Duong’s
report.
When he showed up at the hotel, his face betrayed
the desperation of the situation. He wove a story, increasingly despondent, about the plight of the fishermen in the SCS. The men we saw returning to the harbor earlier were but a few that still had faith they could
earn an honorable living. Most, Duong explained, had
turned to a life of crime to provide for their families.
Needing expertise on the waters, criminal organizations offered any fisherman an opportunity to join
them for a reasonable sum. These recruits became pirates through the Strait of Malacca and the SCS. The
older ones became thieves within the ports, stealing
equipment and anything of value from the anchored
boats. The younger ones trained to become hijackers.
They not only took over boats as teams for ransom from
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large companies or countries, but they also learned
to remove identification marks on the boat to create
phantom ships. Duong continued the back brief as he
explained how these actions raised insurance rates, began restricting free trade, and increased already high
tensions between littoral states, their neighbors and
the countries whose flagged ships were attacked or
hijacked.10

Figure 1. Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery
in SCS (1995-2013).11
Duong sat back and asked for a moment before continuing. I could see the anxiety in his face as he prepared
to finish telling me the situation. He sighed as he relayed the increasing popularity of human trafficking as
a secondary effect of this economic loss. Piracy and the
creation of phantom ships provided more opportunities
for transnational criminal organizations (TCO) to move
human cargo freely through the Strait of Malacca and
the SCS. The increase in activity was dynamic in countries already heavily involved in these practices.12 The
unending poverty started an avalanche of individuals
willing to find and sell women and children to traffickers to provide for the most basic needs. Due to the over-
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whelming increased supply of human capital, TCOs
paid next to nothing for the victims, while their customers, brothel keepers, business owners, home owners, insurgents, would-be parents, and sellers on the medical
black market, now heavily vested in human trafficking,
made enormous profits, further increasing demands.13
Once again, the use of phantom ships became prevalent
in order to move the increasing number of slaves, skyrocketing current conditions to crisis. Countries in the
region, frantic to keep the populace from uprising due
to economic distress, no longer adhered to anti-piracy or
human trafficking regulations.14
I took a deep breath and tried to comprehend all
of the complexities of this situation across the whole
region. Recalling the number of errors outlined by the
PACOM commander in the briefing, I was determined
not to make the same critical mistakes in my assessment of this situation. I pulled out my laptop to review
my previous mishaps. The first thing I considered was
whether I had a good understanding of the situation.
Duong provided me information from the sources at
ground zero, thus I felt I knew everything I needed to
begin planning.
I navigated to the Joint Interagency Center for Strategic Lessons Learned (JICSLL) webpage to see if there
was any information pertinent to the situation.15 After
about 2 hours of clicking broken links, I finally found
information on piracy. Opening the report, I realized
it was all information on handling piracy in the Gulf of
Aden. I bookmarked the report. Efforts in that area of
operations had shown success, so I was confident that
the United States could use the Gulf of Aden operations as templates for this situation. At least there was
a model for me to refer to, and there was no time to
reinvent the wheel.
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Photo by U.S. Navy.

Picture 3. U.S. Forces Arresting Suspected Pirates.
Remembering the need for interagency coordination and planning, I attempted to contact the State
Department liaison to discuss previous and ongoing
anti-piracy efforts and any political considerations
or sensitivities to U.S. intervention. I also sent emails
and left messages for the military attaches within the
affected countries to ensure we discussed, in a multinational forum, the issues with territorial waters and
incidents crossing those lines. I left word at the embassies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, and the
Philippines to set up conference calls about our territorial questions. Issues with secure communications and
the time differences prevented our interaction with the
State Department and the attaches. I resolved to continue my analysis without their input, noting the attempt
at collaboration.
After a few hours of poring over the issues, the articles downloaded from the JICSLL, and some hasty
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planning, I arrived at a plan of operation for the region’s
current problems. Duong and I reviewed the plan and
agreed it was an aggressive course of action ready for
immediate implementation.
•	Aggressive patrols throughout the Strait of Malacca and SCS to deter or defeat pirates before
they board vessels.
•	Immediate turnover of all captured pirates by
partners or affected countries to the International Criminal Court for prosecution.16
•	Searches conducted on all vessels to look for
contraband or slave movement.
•	
Increased presence in areas known to be involved with human trafficking to provide local
officials with actionable information.
I smiled to myself, proud of the decisions and quick
planning I was able to complete. I forwarded the plan to
higher headquarters, and, since I was the subject matter expert on the ground, actions on my directives were
immediate. Orders given and execution underway,
I returned to my lodging to await progress updates.
The plan delivered immediate noticeable results. The
increased maritime patrols, searches, and aggressive
pursuit produced a surge in the capture of pirates now
facing adjudication by the International Criminal Court
(ICC). Patrols interdicted multiple phantom ships transporting trafficking victims to new locations. Traffickers
noticed PACOM personnel in their establishments, and
local authorities noted reports on these businesses. I
took 30 days of leave, and upon my return, met with
Duong, anticipating great success stories and a phone
call from the boss lauding my accomplishments.
Duong told me to sit down and ordered us both a
drink, which was unusual for him, but I took a long
sip of the cool beverage and anxiously awaited his
14

report. Instead of praise, the information I received was
unexpected, lapsing me into silence and deep thought.
Although initial estimates flaunted great success in decreasing both piracy and trafficking incidents, Duong’s
informants and research revealed higher incidents of
both, as well as new issues throughout the area of operations. The rapid capture and removal of pirates left
a greater number of families lacking their primary provider; economic stress in the region increased. There
were more women and children homeless, without
food, and unable to sustain themselves. The great rise
in such poverty began riots and uprisings in the cities.
Citizens quickly lost confidence in their government’s
ability to provide, and anti-U.S. sentiments rose. The
lack of food and shelter overwhelmed the abilities of
underfunded and immature social programs leading
to the desperate undertaking of low-level crime by
displaced families.
Although patrols interdicted phantom ships with
thousands of human slaves, the lower supply across
the network increased both demand and cost for new
slaves. TCOs noticed the presence of our personnel in
trafficking establishments and began preying on those
lacking proper training or unfamiliar with routine human trafficking practices. Promises of dances, “fun
nights,” and cold drinks created an additional increase
in demand for slaves in the dance clubs and brothels
as personnel unwittingly involved themselves in trafficking as customers. Although we forwarded reports
on such establishments, the owners had the majority of
the authorities on their payroll. The reports from our
personnel to the authorities caused backlash within the
clubs. Owners lashed out at their workers for talking to
U.S. personnel about their “contracts” and incidents of
severe violence increased.
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Picture 4. Sex Trafficking Victim.
I dropped my head into my hands and could hear
the Commander’s voice in my head, ticking off the
problems with my plan. “As you can see, Maestro, your
plan was incomplete. There are key considerations
missing which resulted in these second order effects
and further destabilization.” My shoulders slumped as
I imagined her ticking off some of the most important
strategic lessons we learned at the U.S. Army War College. What was I thinking? These were rookie mistakes.
I raised my head, looked at Duong, and we spoke at
length about our next steps. We hoped to somehow
reverse the additional damage my first plan caused. I
annotated the previous observations, added the new
considerations and my second planning session began.
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Reflections.
1. Develop means and methods that enhance collaboration with interagency and international organizations. Failing to include partners in the planning
process makes it extremely difficult to include them
in the execution. Methods must look at problems holistically: A purely tactical or “ground zero” viewpoint
limits thinking and does not incorporate operational or
strategic considerations.
2. Find relevant examples to learn from. Strategic
lessons from past operations are valuable, but we must
understand the differences in the new context. One size
does not fit all.
3. Conduct in-depth wargaming. A robust strategic
wargame can reveal predictable unintended consequences—such as the impact of our actions on poverty
and crime. Knowing this could allow us to develop
mitigating strategies.
4. Do everything possible to understand the whole
system before acting. Our injection into existing international systems without knowing how they operated
was disruptive and caused unintended consequences.
Personnel not understanding the human trafficking
problem became consumers, while our misunderstanding of the authorities’ relationship with traffickers led
to worsening human security conditions.
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THIRD DREAM
The Specter of Terrorism.
I opened my eyes and found myself sitting alone
in a darkened movie theater. I heard the familiar rattle
and click of a film projector, as images began to flash on
the screen. A solemn voiceover with a thick Indonesian
accent began speaking.
The war against heretics and infidels continues. It has
inspired martyrs from all over the world. They have
fought in Syria and Iraq to build the Islamic caliphate and terrorize unbelievers and apostates into submission. As more brothers replace them, the veterans
progressively return to their homes to light the world
ablaze with jihad.17 Soon caliphs will rule the world.
Soon the heretic Shias will be expunged. Soon the hated
infidels will be put to flight.

The screen was filled with the face of a young soldier from Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS). His name
was Yuda, and it was his voice that narrated the scene.
The screen faded and cut to Yuda crouched in a shadowed doorway, while the throng of Jakarta’s street
bustled by. His heart thumping, the minutes ticked
on. Then it was time. He sent the cellphone signal. Almost immediately, there were flames, a shock wave,
and an ear-shattering eruption as the world was freed
of the Shia blasphemies from the Islamic Cultural
Center. Exultant, Yuda melted into the now-panicked
crowd and disappeared. As instructed, he had dealt a
blow to the heart of Jakarta’s Shia population; it was
the start of a more pure jihad. Across Indonesia, other
brothers would be attacking the corrupt Polri (police)18
and Western companies that were raping the Indone-
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sian resources. It might take many martyrs but it was
inevitable: Indonesia would be a Sunni State under
shari’a law.19

Photo by Zoriah.

Picture 5. JAS Terrorist.
In August 2014, JAS broke away from Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir’s Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) when Abu
Bakar declared allegiance to Daish, the Islamic State.20
Abu Bakar was the longtime ideological leader of JAT
and prior to that, of Jemaah Islamiya (JI).21 Yuda, like
many previous JAT fighters, was a Syrian combat veteran with the al-Qaeda linked Jabhat al-Nusra (JN).22
He had gone to Syria to learn the ways of jihad and
to bring new knowledge home. But when Abu Bakar
declared allegiance to the Islamic State, it was clear that
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JAT had lost its way. Yuda thought the Islamic State
were narcissists, always taking films of themselves.23
They committed atrocities against Sunni Muslims and
even fought al-Nusra; such was their lust for power.
As Yuda slipped deeper into the city, he knew it was
imperative to act with strength now, so those who had
sworn allegiance to the Islamic State would not have a
chance to usurp the righteous Indonesian jihadis.24
A smile curled on Yuda’s lips. JAS would prove
themselves more powerful and more pure than JI or
JAT! They had learned many lessons and made many
comrades from all over the world, including some
Australian brothers who had now joined them to
fight for Indonesia. It was these things that would be
the seeds of victory. JAS would exploit corrupt officials
and the weakness of the apostates, heretics, and infidels. It would build a shadow economy to fund its war,
based on piracy, protection taxes, and trafficking Shia
and Christian women and children to the fleshpots of
Bangkok. They would train male children for jihad in
jungle schools, and they would strike the symbols of
Western imperialism. Perhaps most importantly, they
had learned to coordinate their effects using social media,25 cyberattack,26 and martyrdom. They had even
learned from the Free Aceh Movement27 and the Arabs
from the Islamic State how to build a shadow state.
They had learned from Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL)
how to build a social movement that converted and
cared for its followers.28 Using these tactics, they would
force the secular Government of Indonesia to declare
itself a Sunni State under shari’a law. Today was the
glorious beginning.
As I watched the images unfold on the screen and
heard Yuda’s thoughts, I realized I had a rare glimpse
into the mind of my adversary. Abruptly, the theater
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darkened, and the scene shifted. Now I found myself
in the PACOM operations center and a “flash” signal
had just arrived from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia. The Shia Islamic Center had been bombed,
and at least 200 people had been killed and wounded.
As I was digesting this, there was a call over satellite
phone saying that the Jakarta cellphone network had
crashed under the combined weight of a cyberattack
that had degraded services, just as there was a spike
in demand following the bombing. Then came another report. This time one of Chevron’s offshore oil
platforms in East Kalimantan’s Kutei Basin had been
captured. Chevron Pacific Indonesia was the largest producer of crude oil in Indonesia and a major
contributor to the Indonesian economy.
This was going to be a major disruption. It also
showed that the perpetrators had some form of maritime capacity. I took a deep breath and remembered
Yuda’s thoughts. I knew that, although these events
were both tragic and dramatic, they were only the
opening salvos in a new campaign of terror. Clearly,
we needed a strong response. The first thing to do
would be to send the special operations boys from
Joint Task Force 510 (JTF-510) to assess the situation
and take back our oil platform.29 I congratulated myself on being a step ahead. Just then the Commander
walked in. “Maestro,” she boomed. “The Indonesian Government is dealing with this one, but I want
to know that our people are safe, and then I want to
know how PACOM can support a smart approach.”
With belated clarity, I realized that I had focused too
quickly on the military element of power and not considered the full range of national and international
options. In fact, an overtly military response might be
counterproductive.
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What else had I learned from Yuda? As the operations center hummed and buzzed around me, I tried
to make coherent sense of his thoughts. The terrorists
were trying to ignite underlying sectarian tensions between the majority Sunnis and the minority Shia and
Christian populations. They must have a safe base or
bases in the jungle. He was from JAS, which had links
to the Island of Sulawesi, an outlying Island within easy
travelling distance to Malaysia and the Philippines. I
also knew that there were Australian and Arabic jihadi
links, so it was clear that this had an international dimension. JAS had a social movement to provide dawah
(outreach) and possibly a political element. Therefore,
this was not just a straight fight, it would demand, as
the Admiral said, a smart approach.
With deeper consideration, I realized we needed
to start with the ends in mind and tailor PACOM’s
response to address both the short- and long-term issues. We needed to focus on the transnational aspects
of the growing terror threat in South East Asia and
undermine the sometime fractious links between the
mosaic of militias that run between the Middle East
and the Pacific. We required cross-jurisdictional efforts and, potentially, an interagency task force to
protect borders, trade, and maritime assets. All of
this had to be nuanced carefully with respect to the
sovereignty of the nations and international organizations concerned. Ultimately, our enemy was terrorism rather than individual terrorist groups.30 To win,
we must take a comprehensive approach to mitigate
the international drivers and enablers of terrorism:
including extremism and abuse, poor education, shadow economies, and corruption, as well as weak and
illegitimate governance.
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We should promote the rule of law and thereby increase normalcy as a means to reduce extremism. At the
national level, our efforts should strengthen our security partners, rather than trying to solve their problems
our way. We needed to provide a more compelling and
transparent future than the austere and dogmatic one
offered by the extremists.
As I walked into the Commander’s office to brief her
on my analysis, she handed me a photo. I was shocked
to see Yuda’s face. He was a ringleader, and his details
had just been transmitted to Special Detachment 88,
the Indonesian counterterrorist police, courtesy of the
Turkish Security Directorate. Globalization works both
for and against the terrorists, I thought. While looking
at the photo, I stole a moment to gather my thoughts.

Photo by Sam 193746.

Picture 6. Indonesian Security Forces.
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Reflections.
1. Develop strategies that focus on terrorism first,
not terrorists. Strategies focused exclusively on countering terrorists rarely achieve long-term success.
2. Counter the terrorists’ use of the global system.
Transnational terrorists are enabled by globalization as
much as they violently reject it. Efforts to reduce terrorist freedom of action (funding, movement, reinforcement, and resupply), divide rival factions and unite
moderates, and deter retention and recruitment.
3. Employ a smart approach that applies multipartner efforts. Combining both soft and hard power
together achieves more comprehensive results. In a
globalized world, “civil-military cooperation” needs to
increasingly replace “joint operations” as the byword
for teamwork.
4. Redefine success to mean stability or nonviolent
change. Since World War II, nonstate and intrastate conflict has become the most prevalent form of armed conflict. In this context, civil stability rather than military
victory is the definition of success. Therefore, militaries
need to reconsider their doctrines of decisive battle and
the now trite cliché of “hearts and minds” to focus on
building confidence in civil governance. In this context,
the military will often be the essential enabler. Militaries should craft their efforts to reinforce legitimacy and
build normalcy.
FOURTH DREAM
Dhaka’s Despair.
Standing on the second floor of an old office building, I looked around at the wreckage. The ceiling tiles
were stained with water damage, and the florescent
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lights flickered randomly. Through the thin-pained
windows, I heard the sounds of dense city traffic and a
bustling city. Suddenly a deep rumble echoed through
the building. The floor beneath my feet began to shake
violently with an aftershock, and windows shattered
and walls cracked. I could barely maintain my balance
as I frantically tried to escape the building before it
collapsed.
It was nearing 3 a.m. in Dhaka, Bangladesh, when
the earthquake struck. They so often seem to come in
the middle of the night. The Bangladeshis must have
known it was coming—they had predicted that a magnitude 8 earthquake would occur soon as this seemed
to be a centennial event around the three fault lines running under Dhaka. The locals expect a big earthquake
every 80 years or so, and it had been over 120 years
since the last one. They were overdue.
The office building I had been visiting belonged to
the city’s engineer—at least it did before it collapsed.
Thankfully, he was not inside when it fell. So many
buildings were damaged beyond repair during the
earthquake, and the loss of life was horrific. A combination of poor building material and widespread
violations of building codes and basic engineering
principles led to a level of destruction none of the official estimates predicted. It is hard to say how many
buildings were destroyed, but it was obvious that
it was far more than the 70,000 we thought it would
be. Unregulated growth over the past decade made it
impossible to know how many buildings were standing before the earthquake, or how many people might
actually have been in the city.
The destruction of the buildings was only part of
the problem. The bigger problems were the fires from
the unmapped gas lines that crisscross the city. That
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was why we were visiting the engineer’s office: hoping
that maybe he had some insight as to how to turn off
the flow of natural gas. Nobody seemed to know where
the central switches to the gas lines might be, if they
existed at all.31
The Fire Service and Civil Defense (FSCD) had not
been able to coordinate much more than local responses: Their buildings were among the first to collapse,
and very few response vehicles were still in operation.
Even if they were operational, few people knew how
to operate the equipment. The shiny new fire trucks
donated by friendly nations (like the United States
and China) were showpieces and not used for training or operations. Barring these challenges, the streets
were largely nontrafficable for anything larger than a
rickshaw. Help from neighboring firehouses was not
forthcoming: With the landlines and cell towers down,
there was no way to contact the other stations to see
what condition they were in or to coordinate a larger
response effort.
Local survivors scrambled over piles of rubble, risking their lives to find survivors in the wreckage. Reminiscent of the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster, untrained locals
climbed into the tight spaces looking for their families
and friends, often creating new problems as they added
weight to already precarious structures. You could not
blame them for wanting to help, but a little training or
supervision might have prevented more loss of life. I
wondered why this was not covered in our last few
exercises. Earthquakes were the focus of our partnership emergency response program, but we somehow
missed a few key items.
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Photo by Demotix.

Picture 7. Rana Plaza, 2013.
Thankfully, Bangladeshi Army units were not in the
parts of Dhaka most affected by the earthquake. The
Army was the most professional and competent organization in Bangladesh, and this time it did not wait
for official orders before responding.32 Soldiers quickly
began opening key routes for aid to arrive. Their first
priority was clearing Chittagong Highway, which connected the city to the country’s only port. This would
prove to be the vital lifeline for the city.
Relief supplies coming from the Regional Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance—part of the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID)—were to come
from warehouses in Dubai, but had to be transloaded
in Singapore, because the ships coming out of Dubai
were too large for Bangladesh’s shallow port, and even
military over-the-shore logistics capabilities were not
as useful as we thought they would be.
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Photo by Bob Dixon.

Picture 8. Dhaka’s River Port Only
Handles Shallow Barges.
The biggest shortfall in local response was in medical and search and rescue. We simply did not have
enough responders to go around, and the assets that
were arriving from all the different nations were poorly
coordinated. We would have set up more field hospitals closer to the city center, but there was no room
anywhere in the city for them: All the green space in
the city was used up by makeshift slums and unauthorized construction. We had to set up outside the city, but
there was no way for people to get to us. Emergency
vehicles could not get through the city quickly even
before the earthquake—it was impossible now. Surely,
we could have planned for this.
How could the devastation be so much worse than
we anticipated? Why were we so unprepared to help?
Why was the response so slow as thousands of re28

sponders sat waiting to help? In my mind, I reviewed
our prior planning. We based many of our plans on the
U.S. response in Haiti.33 We rehearsed earthquake response with the Bangladeshis at the last two disaster
response exercise and exchanges.34 We front-loaded
engineering units in our force flow, but it would take
weeks before they would be on the ground to help in
a meaningful way. Indian Army units started arriving
right away, but coordination was extremely difficult,
because we had never included them in our exercises.

Photo by U.S. Army Pacific.

Picture 9. U.S. Military Training
Bangladeshi Responders.
We did many things right. We learned from our
past experiences and applied the best practices, to include early alert of engineer, logistics, medical, and
signal units. We mobilized dozens of contracting officers and established liaison with USAID, international
governmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). We established a Joint
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Task force (JTF) and put a well-trained commander
in charge.
As I reflected on the difference between the plan
and the execution, a few ideas emerged. First, those
partners we have been conducting exercises with were
in the earthquake zone. Most of them were among
the victims and were not much help. At any rate, our
exercises never anticipated a disaster this size. We
were overconfident about our ability to respond and
their ability to operate. The Center of Excellence for
Disaster Management folks told me that we kept
making the same mistakes over and over.35
Our exercises over the past few years had been
great political events, but had done little to prepare our
partners for a real disaster. If we were serious about
building partner capacity, we had a lot of work to do in
presenting realistic scenarios that challenged capabilities. It was too late to build capacity after the crisis has
started. Also, our exercises should have included the
most likely external responders if they were going to be
of any use for planning. You do not want to meet a new
partner in the middle of a crisis like we did this time.
The differences in our exercises and what happened
on the ground was foreseeable. Dhaka was a fragile
city, with obvious potential for a large-scale natural
disaster that dwarfed the 2011 Haiti Earthquake. Lack
of elected city government and widespread corruption
led to a capability vacuum between the neighborhood
and national level. Unregulated construction resulted
in a large proportion of the multistory buildings in
the city being vulnerable to collapse. USAID and the
Bangladesh Department of Disaster Management estimated that a minimum of 76,000 buildings would likely
collapse during an earthquake of 7.0 or higher.36 Other
estimates were much higher (one study suggests that
200-300,000 buildings would collapse).37 The immedi30

ate search and rescue problem was only the beginning.
It looks like around 400,000 buildings were damaged
beyond repair, including nearly all of the 850 hospitals.38 Disease, dehydration, and starvation are the next
threats. Our exercises surely did not prepare us for this!
Second, using lessons from our past operations was
not necessarily the best way to approach planning for
this event. While past experience can be useful, it was
important to know what was different about our current context. While we based much of our planning on
the U.S. response to Haiti, Dhaka is not Port-au-Prince.
Besides the fact that Dhaka has more than 10 times the
population, its physical layout is also very different.
Looking at the map, I observed the differences in the
geography: The ports and the coastline, in particular,
were a real issue. It was a long ways from Chittagong
to Dhaka, and that road was nearly useless between the
flooding and the traffic. The coastline was nearly all
delta, which made over-the-shore logistics very difficult, and overland travel from there nearly impossible.
We should have seen that coming.

Figure 2. Earthquakes in Bangladesh.
Note the Distance from Dhaka to Chittagong,
the Nation’s Only Port.39
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One of the biggest lessons from Haiti was the use of
contracting officers to procure food and water quickly
for the population. While PACOM stood ready with
contracting officers, the bigger challenge was finding
suppliers who could actually deliver food and water to
the population. Making room to operate was a bigger
problem here, too. There was little to no room to establish refugee camps or operating bases in Dhaka. Undocumented and informal urban growth over the last
decade has consumed nearly every inch of open space
in the city. Our maps were relatively useless in helping
us understand the city and the actual whereabouts of
the people. Unregulated growth also meant that we really could not know how many victims there were, or
where they would try to go.
Third, we were not really sure what the Chinese, Indians, or other regional responders would do. While we
conducted exercises with the Bangladeshi Army and
the FSCD, we did not include other potential partners.
Coordinating the efforts would have been much easier
if we had exercised together before the event. We were
playing a pick-up game when it counted the most. We
typically get great political benefits from conducting
exercises bilaterally, but the loss of goodwill we experienced because of the muddled response was entirely
counterproductive.
In Haiti, 26 countries provided significant military
assets to earthquake response. We should have expected close to that in Dhaka, but we had not worked
with most of these potential partners. The challenges
of geography, logistics, and sustainment frustrated
potential partners, as it was difficult to move and sustain response forces in this environment. We must
manage this closely at the highest levels, as the political implications of frustrating partners will have
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resounding effects. USAID lacks sufficient staffing to
integrate representatives from United Nations (UN)
and NGO relief activities. PACOM has to augment
USAID in this capacity. We also have to be sensitive
to sovereignty issues: As the government of Bangladesh (GOB) recovers, they will be in charge of the operations. Augmentation to the GOB may be another
significant requirement for us.
The Indian military was prepared to contribute
the most to the effort. They may, in fact, be the lead
response nation as their ability to respond is greater
than anyone else’s. We are not always good at letting
other nations take the lead, but we should be prepared
to take a secondary role if India steps up. It would have
been nice if we had included them in exercises prior to
this, where we could have sorted all of this out. Perhaps
the example of the Multinational Coordination Center
established in the Philippines after Super Typhoon
Yolanda would be a model for future exercises.40
Fourth, I underestimated the friction between our
sustainment supplies and the relief goods flowing in.
We focused planning on getting our people and equipment here and sustaining them, but we seemed to have
ignored the fact that every container that arrives for us
was one less container for the population. Dhaka would
be out of water in 2 days, and out of food in 3 days. This
place was fragile before, and if we did not do this right,
it was going to get a lot worse. Again, the earthquake
was just the beginning.
In our rush to get our forces on the ground, we did
not realize how much competition there would be for
the strained flow systems. Our influx hindered the flow
of other response nations and sustainment supplies
for the millions of internally displaced persons that
needed humanitarian assistance (HA). We dramati-
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cally underestimated the number of victims (which
drives how much HA needs to flow), and the number
of other responders that needed to get to the city. Our
poor planning unnecessarily contributed to the friction.
In the future, our planners must find the balance between flowing forces in and bringing supplies to the
city. We must not monopolize the flow systems for our
own movement or sustainment, or we will make the
situation worse.
Finally, we needed to figure out in advance how
we were going to create a common operating picture
(COP) for everyone. As we set up, we focused mostly
on ourselves, establishing our networks but not including some of the other partners. Forget our classified
systems. In fact, we probably needed to forget using
military systems at all. One thing I did not find in any
of our military “lessons learned” documents was the
fact that social media was a better, faster, and more accurate means of getting a COP than anything we can do
alone. Everyone from victims, NGOs, IGOs, and other
interested parties can contribute, but only if we enable
them. This was likely the most essential piece of our
response: getting and distributing an accurate assessment of the problem.
The COP must truly be common. If we try to use
our current software on unclassified systems, we will
also create large challenges for our partner responders, both military and civilian. Additionally, we do not
have enough collection assets or mapping capability
to truly understand where help is most needed. The
situation changes continuously and quickly, and our
ability to understand and share is extremely limited.
There will be huge competition for bandwidth, both by
responders and survivors.

34

We must divorce ourselves from our understanding of a COP. In Haiti, CrisisMappers, a volunteer
group formed on the Internet, developed real time
mapping and situational understanding remotely using social media.41 U.S. Marine units were essentially
being directed by volunteers in Syracuse, New York,
who were monitoring, translating, and mapping disaster response needs in real time. None of the military lessons-learned documents actually captured
this, and none of the military or government systems
came close to replicating it. Most of our “lessons
learned” were U.S. Government-centric, and failed
to capture the amazing power of social media and
crowd sourcing.
Creating a venue, downloadable applications, and
real-time data-basing that not only enabled crowd
sourcing and wiki mapping, but also exploited the
power of social media for information sharing would
have enabled all partners to understand simultaneously a true common operating picture. This will continue
to be a huge challenge both to our signal and intelligence communities as they are stuck in 20th century
procedures and capabilities, yet it is vital that responders learn how to use these powerful resources.
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Source: ICCM crisismappers.net.

Picture 10. CrisisMappers Gathered and Shared
Information about the Haiti Earthquate More
Quickly and Accurately than Official Channels.
I paused for a moment, taking in the destruction
and chaos. “We can do this better,” I said to my driver.
“We couldn’t do much worse,” he replied, heading for
the truck. As we pulled out and headed back to the embassy, it dawned on me that an earthquake in Dhaka
was really just one of the many challenges we could
face in the Pacific. Climate change, massive urbanization, and unregulated growth in many Asian cities are
creating similar dynamics in dozens of countries. If the
United States wishes to remain the security partner of
choice to the Asian nations, we are going to have to
take a hard look at how we prepare to respond. After
all, armed conflict is only one type of security concern.
The prevention or easing of human suffering is something everyone understands, and doing it well gives
the United States more credibility in the region than a
dozen armed incursions. As we drove past the rubble
and fires on our way back to the embassy, I jotted down
a few notes to pass back to the team at PACOM.
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Reflections.
1. Be realistic about “Building Partner Capacity.” It
does not happen overnight and cannot happen during
a crisis.
2. Find relevant examples. Not every lesson translates to your current situation. Context matters.
3. Be prepared to work with nontraditional partners. Not everyone you play with on game day went to
the practices. By the way, one of the new players may
be in charge.
4. Avoid self-centered planning. If your plan focuses
on your forces more than the problem, you will hinder
success. Keep the big picture in mind.
5. Make sure your “common operating picture” is
truly common. Figure out the best way to create and
maintain the picture for all partners.
FIFTH DREAM
A Nightmare with China.
I found myself in a large command and control facility, seated at a large table nestled beneath a colossal
digital map of the world. The map was surrounded by
large monitors, displaying various news reports and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) video
feeds. It was sprinkled with icons from a broad spectrum of naval forces, which were conveniently color
coded to discern between enemy and friendly forces. I
quickly recognized that a large force on force engagement between U.S. and Chinese naval forces was already underway in the SCS. The number of red Chinese icons dramatically outnumbered and surrounded
the blue U.S. icons, and this caused great distress for
an admiral seated at the head of the table. Like a scene
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from Dr. Strangelove, he angrily pounded his fist on
the table and cursed at the big board. The rest of the
players surrounding the table recognized they were
powerless to influence the contest, as it unfolded on
the screen before them. The admiral shook his head in
disbelief, “How did this happen—how did we not see
this coming?” His question was rhetorical, but a young
analyst seated next to me leaned in and quietly offered
a detailed explanation.
China’s economic growth was both astonishing and
alarming to rest of the world. It was also unsustainable.
The prosperity of its economy hinged on exports and
aggressive currency manipulation, thus the Western
economic crisis of 2008 also stunted China’s economic
progress.42 To mask the slower growth, China accumulated a massive amount of debt and invested most of
the money in state-owned enterprises. This practice resembled the U.S. housing bubble, and it created a similar debt bomb. When the bubble burst, the debt bomb
ravaged the Chinese economy.
The collapse of North Korea further strained the
Chinese economy, as hordes of refugees flooded China’s border. The conditions within North Korea were
far worse than anyone had imagined, and the world
was ill-prepared to deal with the scale of the calamity.
Collaboration between South Korea, the United States,
and China was imperative to plot a productive future
for North Korea, yet distrust and lack of transparency
dominated these engagements; cooperation was steadily replaced with competition and suspicion. The Chinese government was furious with U.S. interventions
in North Korea—this was a problem on China’s borders that should be handled by China alone. Western
meddling was completely unwelcome. There were also
frequent clashes between U.S. and Chinese military
forces, as both sought to stabilize and control North
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Korea on their terms. These confrontations had not yet
escalated beyond a few warning shots, but it was only
a matter of time before blood would be shed. China’s
own economic struggles, coupled with the strain of the
influx of North Korean refugees caused mass uprisings
against Communist Party officials.43
Desperate to squash the rebellion and distract the
masses, China’s rulers saw an opportunity in the SCS.
China’s claims to Taiwan were a matter of national
pride. Reclaiming the island would fuel the fire of Chinese nationalism, and the people would quickly forget their own selfish economic struggles.44 While the
United States maintained a hardline with China on the
sovereignty of Taiwan, there was no cause to believe
that China would violently enforce its claims. Thus, the
United States was caught completely off guard when
the invasion began.
China began the assault with a barrage of ballistic
and cruise missiles to weaken Taiwan’s defensive systems. In the next salvo, she launched a wave of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, and cyberattacks to blind
the U.S. response forces. A U.S. Carrier Strike Group
(CSG) led by the USS Eisenhower launched from Japan
and sped towards the Taiwan Strait. In an instant, I was
in the tower of the Eisenhower. Flights of F-35Cs vaulted
from the deck of the carrier, as the white glow of their
afterburner plumes illuminated the night sky. Alerts
sounded, as rapidly moving blips on the ship’s radar
screens warned of the hoard of inbound DF-21D carrier killer missiles. The missile launches were perfectly
coordinated with crippling cyber and satellite attacks,
disorienting and blinding the CSG’s defense forces. The
carrier killing missiles rained down from the skies at
speeds exceeding MACH 10, and I braced for impact
as the first wave of missiles met their mark. The explosions shook the carrier violently, as a massive fireball
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engulfed the deck of the carrier, and destroyed two F35Cs taxiing to the catapults. I sprinted down the stairs
from the tower to assist with fire suppression, as a second salvo of missiles struck the carrier. The force of the
explosion swept me off the deck like a rag doll, and I
plunged into the cold water below. Choking on saltwater, I fought to keep my head above water. The deck
of the carrier was now completely engulfed in flames,
filling the air with a suffocating thick black smoke.
Seconds later, a blinding flash filled the sky as a final
salvo of missiles ravaged the ship. I desperately clung
to a floating piece of wreckage. A loudspeaker boomed
over the sounds of claxons and fire alarms with an unmistakable call for all hands to abandon ship. There,
in the depths of the SCS, the unthinkable became a reality, and the mighty Eisenhower slowly sank beneath
the waves.
With the blink of an eye, I was back in the Operations Center, watching the data link feed of four Air
Force B-3 next generation bombers scrambling from
Guam to make the 6-hour flight to strike military targets within China. China’s sophisticated air defenses,
consisting of land and ship mounted S-400 missile systems, could target nonstealth aircraft out to 400 kilometers (km).45 These defense systems made air-to-air
refueling over the SCS impractical, at least until the air
defenses were rolled back. Thus, the bombers entered
Chinese airspace without any fighter or airborne jamming escort. In support of the strikes, U.S. submarines
exhausted their arsenals of Tomahawk land attack missiles against Chinese air defense systems, but these attacks barely left a dent in her formidable surface-to-air
arsenal. Chinese J-20 fighters shot down two of the $550
million stealth aircraft, while the other bombers successfully hit their targets and returned to Guam. Short of
intercontinental ballistic missile strikes and long-range
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cruise missiles, the rest of the U.S. military’s weapons
lacked the range to target China. It would take at least
a day for the United States to position forces to mount a
coordinated response.
Twenty-four hours after the campaign began,
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) captured Taiwan, and U.S. forces entered the Pacific theater en
mass, postured for retaliation. The losses of the battle
were difficult to comprehend: a carrier strike group
decimated, two 5th generation bombers destroyed,
and Taiwan lost to the PLA. The entire conflict was
so unexpected that the complex coordination to execute Air-Sea Battle tactics successfully never had the
opportunity to manifest.
The young analyst stretched his hands behind his
head and leaned back in his chair. Together we gazed
at the debacle on the big board. I interrupted his train
of thought and asked him to give me more background
on China’s military capabilities. On cue, he pulled out
a binder filled with slides and continued his detailed
discourse.
In 2014, China projected a military budget of
$132 billion.46 While this figure may seem dramatic,
China’s increase in military spending is largely a reflection of her thriving economy.47 In reality, the proportion of China’s gross domestic product (GDP)
allotted to defense spending has remained stagnate
at 2 percent. In contrast, the United States spends 3.8
percent of its GDP on defense (See Figure 3).48 However, when compared to other defense budgets in the
region, the PLA is clearly amassing formidable military
strength, more than doubling the expenditures of other
regional competitors (See Figure 4).49
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Figure 3. U.S.-China Defense Budgets GDP
Percentage Comparison.50

Figure 4. Asia Major Regional Powers
2013 Defense Budgets.51
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The much-hyped DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile
(ASBM) is central to China’s anti-access/area-denial
(A2/AD) strategy. The weapon depends upon a series
of networked systems, and sophisticated sensors to
enable its terminal guidance against moving targets.
Disrupting this system of systems will likely be the
most productive approach to breaking the DF-21Ds
kill-chain,52 and this is precisely the intent of tactics derived from the Air-Sea Battle concept.53 Regardless, the
emergence of ASBMs, like the DF-21D, present a point
of inflection for the U.S. Navy, which in recent history has enjoyed sanctuaries of operation, free from
any credible threats of enemy fire. This will clearly
not be the case in the SCS. Current estimates place the
DF-21Ds maximum effective range at over 2,000-km,54
which would allow China to target aircraft carriers or
support vessels at distances reaching the second island
chain (see Map 2 on page 44).55

Photo by Auaaimoer.

Picture 11. China’s DF21D ABM.
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The PLA has also invested in large numbers of highly accurate anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Virtually
every modern surface ship in the People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) is capable of employing ASCMs.56
These weapons have small radar signatures, fly at low
altitude at supersonic speeds, and can be employed in
salvos. These flight profiles may saturate CSG air defense systems, increasing the probability that the weapons will reach their targets.57 For these reasons, military
analysts have labeled these weapons as the true carrier
killers.58

Map 2. Depiction of the First and
Second Island Chain.59
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is
also in the process of fielding two 5th Generation fighters, the J-20 and the J-31. While information on these
aircraft is obviously limited, they are clearly born from
the same DNA as the U.S. F-22 and F-35. Both aircraft
will likely employ the PLAAF PL-12 and PL-13 air-toair missiles. These missiles are postulated to be capable
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of destroying aircraft in a heavy electronic attack environment at extended range.60 No doubt, the air supremacy the United States has taken for granted in previous
conflicts, will be difficult, if not impossible to sustain
in a war with China. Unescorted bombers will also be
acutely vulnerable to this 5th Generation air threat.
Finally, China seeks to exploit U.S. dependence
upon command, control, communication, computer,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
systems. These systems are the lifeblood that will allow
the United States to create the cross-domain synergy
necessary to thrive in the A2/AD environment. China’s
ASAT systems are capable of kinematic strikes against
global positioning systems, surveillance, and communications satellites.61 In 2007, China demonstrated this
capability, as it used an ASAT system to target one of
its aging satellites in orbit.62
As the young analyst concluded, he excused himself and wandered down a darkened corridor at the
base of the big board. I remained in my chair and silently reflected on the scene before me. This was a command and control facility, but command and control
were illusions. The big board was a portal that allowed
us to witness the events completely detached from the
violence, yet we were nothing more than powerless bystanders. Our ability to influence the events had long
since passed, and in that moment our mistakes were
brutally clear to me. All the destabilizing forces in the
region—piracy, human trafficking, terrorism, the threat
of natural disasters, and the collapse of North Korea—
these were critical opportunities for collaboration. Addressing these issues clearly served the interests of both
the United States and China, yet our continued parallel noncollaborative efforts and our persistent lack of
transparency locked us onto a violent collision course.
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Reflections.
1. Be realistic about military capabilities. A military conflict with China is a scenario that even the best
equipped U.S. military will be challenged to handle.
2. Invest in the right kinds of future technologies.
Our most coveted weapons systems may be acutely
vulnerable to emerging threats in the region. Consider
that our current weapons paradigms (stealth fighters
and bombers, aircraft carriers, etc.) may be rendered
obsolete.
3. Do not count on “on call” capabilities defeating
every threat. The promises of Air-Sea Battle can only
be realized if military forces have sufficient warning to
coordinate and synergize effects.
4. Invest in relationships and trust. The path to
peace in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is one of collaboration
with China, leveraging our common interests to build
fruitful relationships.
SIXTH DREAM
A Better Way.
The tension and volume in the voice of the Joint Operations Center (JOC) Director snapped me out of my
uncomfortable slumber. He was in the face of his information technology (IT) contractor, pointing vigorously
at the wall of big screens, demanding the latest in a
series of “computer glitches” be resolved immediately.
“The Admiral will be down here in 20 minutes for her
update. We can’t very well update her if we don’t have
the COP!” he said, referring to the common operational
picture that remained the centerpiece of PACOM’s
increasingly frequent Battle Updates to the PACOM
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Commander. Now occurring every 4 hours, I could see
the so-called “battle rhythm” was increasing to a point
that it was affecting the staff. The staffing cuts forced by
sequestration and budget cuts less than a decade ago
had yet to be overcome—”more with less.” The pace
of the current multiple crises was already affecting the
endurance of the PACOM headquarters staff. This was
compounded by the “pull” from the operational level,
which had resulted in about one-fifth of the staff being
“farmed out” to the JTF staffs. A quick glance around
the JOC confirmed my concerns: Drawn faces and
sunken eyes stared back at me—or past me. And civilian staff members (GS civilians and contractors) nearly
equaled the uniformed members of this, the staff of the
largest regional combatant command in the U.S. military. Core responsibilities were, of course, covered by
military officers, but it was a thin veneer between the
military directors and division chiefs and the civilian/
contractor “worker bees.”
The buzzing from one of those “worker bees” was
close by and familiar. It was the same analyst from my
earlier dream. He was droning on and on with his analysis. I was amazed at (and a little bit intimidated by) the
intellect of this young 20- something. A series of questions swirled in my head: How did he get his Ph.D. so
young? How much should I rely upon his assessments?
How does education and intellect compare to operational experience? Could he maneuver a “Ten-Oh” Bear
Randy Rarick surf board on the North Shore? I shook
my head to break out of this useless loop of rhetorical
questions. “Hold that thought for a minute,” I said to
the analyst. “I need some coffee.” I briefly stepped out
to the small food court attached to the headquarters
building and grabbed a quick dark roast. Returning to
the JOC, I was met as I was coming through the door by
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a bright-eyed Air Force staff sergeant. “Sir, the Senior
Enlisted Adviser has instituted a policy of no food or
drink in the JOC. . . . I guess we’re too sloppy.” I flashed
him my best “ornery O-6” glare, moving past him to my
seat next to the JOC Director’s perch. The screens had
miraculously returned to their normal state—a confusing mosaic of multi-colored icons depicting “friendly,”
“enemy,” “partner,” and a multitude of other designations. “Okay, where were we?” I said to the analyst as
I felt the first hit of hot caffeine, “Run it down from the
beginning, again . . . if you don’t mind.”
China’s economic engine had faltered. Actually,
it was failing. Unsustainable growth, domestic demographic and political factors, and external influences converged to create a deteriorating state that
challenged the Chinese regime’s hold on legitimate
power. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) had
over-reached. Extending its economic appetite worldwide had satisfied immediate needs to continue to fuel
the Chinese engine, but it had come at a cost. China
had become embroiled in messy stability problems
that impinged upon its activities and investments in
Africa.63
As the United States had become less and less embroiled in the Middle East, China had been forced to
become more involved in that region, attempting to
ensure the necessary flow of oil demanded by the voracious Chinese machine. The consequences of China’s
“One Child” policy had come home to roost. Chinese
parents were none too happy as their only children
came home in body bags from what were increasingly
viewed as expeditions of choice versus conflicts of necessity. As Chinese economic power receded, its once
formidable ability to pry acquiescence from weaker
neighbors dropped precipitously. Money follows the
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path of least resistance, and that flow had been diverted
as economies sought more stable markets. See Figures
5 and 6.

Figure 5. China’s Worldwide Reach.64
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Figure 6. China Is Getting Older Before
It Gets Rich.65
Other consequences surfaced as well, of course. The
massive Chinese population, more than half of which
was now urbanized, created a commensurate demand
for everything from energy to food. These urban masses presented an entirely new set of security issues for
the PRC . . . issues the central government seemed illprepared to tackle.66 The seas off the shores of the PRC
were more and more prone to friction and flashpoints
over sources for fish as well as oil and gas. As economic
security became more of an issue for the Chinese people, increases in illicit and illegal activities spiked. Proliferation of technologies and weapons occurred more
often and were more visible, revealing troubling links
to terrorist organizations throughout the region. Desperate for opportunities that were increasingly scarce
in China, human trafficking dramatically increased,
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impacting the European and North American economies as well as those of Southeast Asia, as Chinese
sought opportunities that alluded them at home.
With China focused on domestic stability, North
Korea was further weakened. The PRC, patron to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime,
had been unable to sustain its historical levels of support to the rogue nation. The North Korean leader, ever
suspicious of internal threats to his hold on power,
had fallen back on a tried-and-true strategy: development through coercion. North Korean brinksmanship
had increased along with bellicose statements against
the South Koreans and the United States. Revealing
the depth of North Korean despair, the frequency and
degree of the regime’s famous provocations also increased. Although the development of North Korea’s
ballistic missile program had slowed corresponding
with the decrease in Chinese financial support, the regime had actually augmented its “test program,” firing
almost a dozen missiles into neighboring seas and in
the direction of Japan and the United States in the past
12 months. Brinksmanship was no longer the effective
tool it had once been. Unable to leverage bad behavior
for financial, economic, and social support, the North
Korean regime began to fracture and instability (and
collapse) loomed.
North Korean proliferation networks, previously
all but dormant, were reenergized and links had been
discovered with at least two Southeast Asian terrorist groups. But the collapse of North Korea was most
attributable to the dire food shortages exacerbated by
last year’s severe winter and multiple hits by typhoons
later. Crops were decimated, and famine reached into
the higher levels of the North Korean regime and the
military. Even elite units, charged with protecting the
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regime’s most privileged, were impacted—suffering
resource deficits that lesser units had lived with for
generations.

Source: frontpagemag.com.

Picture 12. Much of the North Korean Population
Suffers from Malnutrition.
Civil unrest, once unheard of, began sporadically.
These uprisings were quickly followed by limited insurrections within the military. The response was immediate. Crushed by the regime, the population was
left no choice, and the mass exodus via the Chinese
border began. The regime was powerless to prevent
the flight of an estimated 30 percent to 50 percent of
its population, especially since the regime itself had
begun to disintegrate. Factions emerged, challenging
regime leaders and backed by military leaders turned
warlords.
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With North Korean refugees swarming their border, the Chinese were faced with yet another security
challenge that they could ill-afford. Domestic stability was at an all-time low in the PRC, mostly due to
the economic downturn and the effect on livelihoods
at nearly every level—not to mention Central Government budgets. Strikes and social uprisings throughout
the country became more common and impossible to
conceal. The intractable security crises the PLA had
engaged in abroad had soured the Chinese people on
the use of force and diminished their confidence in its
capabilities.
The grab for Taiwan was a gambit the new Chinese
president was using to divert domestic attention, occupy a restless and perennially recalcitrant PLA, and provide an opportunity (should things go “well south”) for
a run at disputed oil and gas rich territories in the South
and East China Seas. But it wasn’t going as well as the
PRC leadership had planned—or needed.
I had been Director of the PACOM Commander’s
Action Group for just less than a year, being plucked
from my rather comfortable office on the third deck. I
had just become accustomed to my previous job as the
Southeast Asia Policy Division Chief in the J5. It had
been a bit painful (my first joint assignment) but I had
eventually adjusted, thanks to an extremely competent
crew of military and civilian country directors. I had
been CAG Director long enough to recognize the look
I got from the admiral over her reading glasses as she
strode past me and to the head of the briefing table with
her Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) Ambassador Glazer
right on her heels. I glanced at the JOC Director and
said, “Giddy up, John. Let’s get this thing going.” I
walked up behind the J3, the Marine two-star with his
ever-present smile, who was just taking his seat: “Sir,
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her first question will be ‘Are we closing in on our desired state?’” He nodded briefly and went back to his
green notebook.
The JOC Director had the update slides posted to
the big screens and then indicated to the J2 that he could
begin the briefing. “The Deuce” ran through the confusing COP picture that had been frozen for the briefing just moments ago. He summarized that, while they
were able to push some forces ashore on Taiwan, the
PLA effort appeared to have stalled. Despite their formidable A2/AD capabilities, the PLA had been unprepared for recent technology leaps the United States had
developed that significantly reduced the effectiveness
of Chinese efforts. Two U.S. CSGs stood on the edge of
Chinese range, but close enough to allow U.S. capabilities to influence the advance of the PLA invasion force.
The flow of North Korean refugees had diminished
somewhat, but the PLA was having a devil of a time
contending with the massive influx of helpless humanity. Dozens of refugee camps had been established on
both sides of the border. All were overwhelmed, and
some swelled with hundreds of thousands of North
Koreans.
Militarily, the North Koreans were still quite active—especially at missile sites and recently revealed
bases heretofore undetected. These newly discovered
bases were of particular concern to the PACOM Commander as we had yet to determine what exactly was
going on—known unknowns. The North Korean regime appeared to be gasping its last breath of air just
as the PRC made its move for Taiwan—both the DPRK
and the PRC taking advantage of the strategic distraction the other nation provided.
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The J3 moved forward in his chair and began his
portion of the briefing.
“Ma’am, I’d like to change things up a bit for this
update. Ambassador Glazer and I have discussed the
situation extensively and think we are approaching a
point where, if trends can be reinforced, we will be
able to begin the turn from Phase III to Phase IV of
operations. That is to say, Admiral, that we believe
our desired state may be in site.” Removing her reading glasses and looking up from the briefing notebook
on the table in front of her, the PACOM Commander
asked, “And remind me, what is our desired state?”
Expecting the rhetorical question, the general replied:
“As approved by the [National Security Council], our
desired state is: The territorial integrity of democratic
Taiwan is preserved, North Korean offensive capabilities are destroyed and the DPRK regime is removed,
human suffering on the Korean peninsula is mitigated,
conditions are set for a return to regional stability with
the PRC assuming a primary, productive role.” Halfjokingly, the Commander said to her Deputy, “Not so
long ago, the military would have tried to do this on its
own.” Returning her attention to the update briefing,
the J3 continued, aided by the well-timed comments of
the FPA.
In the back of my mind, I heard the analyst’s voice
from a recent “deep dive” on Sino-U.S. relations . . . :
The U.S. “One China Policy” is hardly monolithic.
Its pillars are the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the
Three Communiques, and the Six Assurances.67 Together, these three pillars confined how the United
States could and would engage in its relationship with
the rise of China. Chinese and American perspectives
on the path relations have taken differ, of course.
What has resulted, however, are well-worn “ruts”
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from which departure is difficult (if not impossible) to
achieve. The arc of Sino-U.S. relations has gone from
one of promised stability to one of increased tension.
Suspicion and lack of transparency have cloaked the
relationship with a sense of inevitable conflict. The
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (TRA) is both prescriptive and proscriptive. At once, it recognizes the People’s Republic as the sole legal government of China
and requires U.S. support for the territorial integrity
of democratic Taiwan.68
Ambassador Glazer’s professorial tone brought me
back to the discussion at the briefing table . . . :
Developing productive, stable relations with the
PRC had been nearly impossible. Decades of mistrust
and skepticism, anchored in Cold War thinking, had
fostered an environment in which every problem was
a security problem and the (predetermined) solution
of choice involved the use of force. In late 2017, the
new U.S. and Chinese presidents met on the margins
of the East Asia Summit in Singapore.
What began as a pro forma, pre-scripted meeting
changed dramatically when the two leaders excused
their respective delegations. Retaining only personal
translators, the Chinese and American leaders spent
2 1/2 hours in a one-on-one discussion that yielded
the Singapore Communique. Modest as the steps it
enumerated were, the Singapore Communique represented a tectonic shift in Sino-U.S. relations. The
two sides agreed to pursue enhanced engagements,
setting aside for the moment the most vexing issues
between the two powers (e.g., Taiwan). Initial steps
included officer exchanges allowing PLA officers to
attend U.S. Senior Service Colleges and U.S. officers
to attend counterpart Chinese institutions. Diplomatically, the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
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(S&ED) was modified. It would move beyond its annual meeting in alternating capitals and now included
more frequent meetings at various levels. These additional forums served to broaden and deepen the SinoU.S. conversation and, significantly, began to erode
layers of distrust. Perhaps most significant, however,
was the agreement to develop cooperative approaches
to security issues of concern to both parties. Specifically, the American and Chinese leaders acknowledge
the dire implications of the deteriorating security situation on the Korean peninsula. While U.S. and Chinese concerns did not match exactly, both presidents
agreed that the trajectory was unacceptable and that
cooperation would be required in order to avoid another military conflict on the peninsula.
The J3 interjected the fact that the convening of the
“High Level Committee on Korean Stability” in the first
place was remarkable. Even more, the fact that it had
been kept behind closed doors and its deliberations
and decisions largely secret would have been unfathomable just a few years ago. The General opined that
the fact that we were not engaged with the PLA on the
peninsula simultaneous with the current Taiwan engagement was directly attributable to the High Level
Committee’s success.
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Figure 7. North Korean Missile Threats Are a Global
Problem, Not Just Regional.69
“Weren’t you and your PLA Committee counterpart classmates at Carlisle Barracks?” the Admiral
interrupted. “Yes, ma’am,” the J3 responded. “Lieutenant General Liu and I were in different seminars,
but we took two electives together— including Great
Books. He was forever complaining there were no
Chinese books on the reading list! That interaction
was invaluable, ma’am. It framed my understanding
of the relationship and, from an operational perspective, my friendship with Liu has not only established a
communications link but has allowed me to see things
from the Chinese perspective . . . to some degree.”70
“Please continue, gentlemen,” the Commander directed, realizing time was wasting. The J3 continued
with a short discussion of the developing standoff in
the East and South China Seas. Losses on both sides had
been significant in the early stages, but both sides dem-
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onstrated restraint as the situation evolved rapidly. The
FPA and the J3 then described how we had successfully
leveraged new and emerging partnerships with regional nations to create an environment that would not tolerate a Chinese hegemon. Vietnam and Malaysia, perhaps the most advanced of South China Sea claimants
had tilted toward the United States as the PRC flexed
its muscles and attempted to pick off the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimant nations
one by one. While neither had been willing to become
treaty allies of the United States, tentative partnerships had grown strong, resulting in access agreements
and increasingly frequent exercises—which meant increased interoperability. Indonesia, maintaining its beloved nonaligned status and its mantra of “a thousand
friends and no enemies,” had nevertheless developed
into a net security contributor. U.S. efforts to support
the development of Indonesian disaster response and
peacekeeping capabilities were now paying dividends.
Indonesia had been named to lead the UN peacekeeping and transitional authority efforts in North Korea.
Moreover, the Indonesian military was now heading
the ASEAN Response Force managing refugee camps
on the North Korean side of the PRC-DPRK border.
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Graphic by economyincrisis.org.

Picture 13. The United States and China May be the
Best Fit for Each Other . . .
If They Would Only Act Like It.

Source: unrefugees.org.au.

Picture 14. UN Refugee Camps
Are Only a Temporary Solution.
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Careful to avoid entanglement in the current crisis,
India had acknowledged its stake in the broader region
and stepped forward to secure commercial shipping
through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and on
through the southern stretches of the SCS.
The J3 and the FPA, nearing the end of their update,
were painting a complex picture that, although not yet
certain, provided a view toward the so-called “desired
state”:
• Taiwan—status quo ante
•	
North Korea—regime change and protracted
international assistance/development efforts
initiated
•	Stable Asia-Pacific region—China a productive leader, fully integrated into an evolving
international order that accommodates Chinese
aspirations.
Ambassador Glazer reminded the PACOM Commander that none of this would have been possible
without integrated regional decisionmaking facilitated
by empowered interagency representatives at PACOM.
Glazer noted his appointment in the PACOM headquarters as the first Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Regional Coordination was a huge step
forward for State/Department of Defense coordination
and cooperation. The authority the FPA had been given
by the PACOM Commander, directive authority equivalent to a Deputy Commander, had been instrumental
in this success. It had resulted in common procedures
and a truly integrated strategy across the region which
had, in turn, facilitated what appeared to be a viable
solution to multiple, converging security dilemmas.
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Picture 15. The Indian Navy Is Among the Most
Powerful and Professional in the World.
As the update briefing broke up, the analyst followed me into the headquarters’ expansive foyer.
Stopping in front of the many displays that depicted
the histories of the headquarter’s namesakes (Admiral
Chester Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur), I
had said to the young Ph.D.: “About the time you were
starting grad school, a series of controversial but crucial changes were being initiated. Those changes, in
both policy and legislation, were necessary for us to
be able to walk out of that briefing with some sense of
accomplishment. We all knew the issues that were in
our way. The funny thing about human beings is we
rarely make obvious changes until we are forced to
do so. And more often than not, we make the changes
after the fact.”
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As I turned to step out the front door for my first
breath of fresh Hawaiian air in 36 hours, I reviewed in
my head how we had come to work together better,
break down some of the opacity with our adversaries,
and, in some cases, work with them. . . .
Reflections.
1. Facilitate (or force) interagency coordination
and collaboration in both planning and execution.
Interagency representatives at the combatant command headquarters must have a mandate (and authority) from their home agency. They also need the
training, experience, and the full understanding of the
commander’s plans and decision criteria.
2. Develop, at every level possible, linkages and
personal interactions with allies, partners, and even potential adversaries. Address the “trust deficit” through
increased transparency in formal/official interactions,
professional military education venues, and informal
opportunities.
3. Move beyond “unsolvable” problems and focus on more benign areas of common concern where
trust and collaborative approaches can foster greater
understanding and develop habits of productive interaction. These can yield great results when the tougher
problems arise.
EPILOGUE
The Indo-Asia-Pacific region encompasses over half
the world’s population and global trade,71 the majority of its current and future mega cities, seven of the
world’s 10 largest armies,72 most of the world’s nuclear
powers, three of the largest economies,73 and accounts
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for 80 percent of the world’s natural disasters.74 As the
United States increases its strategic focus on this vital
region, it would be all too easy to become fixated on
the burgeoning competition between great powers and
overlook or misunderstand the myriad, interconnected
complexities that enrich the region and are the real force
majeure. Simplistic or ill-fitting policy options may be
equally enticing.
The fictional narratives or “dreams” outlined in the
preceding sections seek to depict these interrelated dynamics in a palpable way and provide a comprehensive
strategic document that is readable, instructive, and
provocative. The series of six distinct dreams explore
a progression of steadily escalating planning and contingency scenarios—from steady state security cooperation activities, to piracy, human security, terrorism,
environmental disaster, and major combat. The narratives challenge the reader to consider several regional
dynamics, reflect on a multitude of intended (and unintended) consequences of U.S. action, and share in the
many strategic observations our protagonist makes
during his hypothetical sleep-induced journey. The
sixth and final dream weaves these themes and lessons
together to comprehensively highlight the unique opportunities for “collective assurance” borne through
enhanced collaboration and understanding. Most significantly, the closing dream challenges our traditional
definition of strategic “success” and encourages the
development of a “better way.” Building on the specific observations outlined by our protagonist along his
journey, we offer the following synthesis of strategic
insights for further consideration by policymakers and
strategists.
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Insight 1: Understand the Environment.
At its core, the PACOM AOR is a very complex
geopolitical system with numerous internal and external dynamics and actors at play. The primary drivers
of this system appear to be the ongoing strategic competition between the United States and China, and the
perceived insecurity of other nations that may feel compelled to choose one over the other. The United States
typically emerges as the desired partner for security
interests, and China is the preferred choice when the
stakes are financial. The dynamic interplay of these
changing alliances and partnerships could be likened to
a basic weighing scale, with the balance of power shifting by issue and interest. However, to view this environment as a zero sum game for influence between the
great powers is a perilous and ill-fitting generalization.
Policymakers require a comprehensive, systemic, and
more accurate understanding of the PACOM AOR due
to the sheer scope and scale of the region. The complexity of the region is further increased by the presence of
multiple global and regional powers, and the multitude
of small nation states whose UN voting power is disproportionate to their size. In this context, understanding the potential consequences of our actions (or inactions) is vital for effective steady state and contingency
planning.
Insight 2: The Cost of Collaboration
Is Lower than the Price of Failure.
Substantive interagency, international, and nongovernmental collaboration is essential throughout the
entire policymaking and planning process. This is particularly true when seeking to understand and engage
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in a complex, adaptive environment like the PACOM
AOR. While the costs and hurdles of securing cooperation may be challenging, the price of incomplete and
erroneous understanding is far greater. This is particularly apparent in an environment like the PACOM
AOR, where the military tool set—and, arguably, any
government face—may be insufficient in dealing with
and understanding the challenges at hand. Having the
right expertise, credibility, and viewpoints in the room
is essential to strategic success.
Insight 3: Expect Unintended Effects.
Simplistic solutions or strategies that may have
worked in other areas are unlikely to work the same
way if applied without careful consideration. Insufficient understanding of the differences in context is likely to lead to unintended effects. These may exacerbate
and transform the original problem into something different or worse.
Strategists and policymakers need to systematically understand the problem, comprehensively plan,
and contingency plan, and then execute with flexibility—cognizant that any action will result in a reaction that is not necessarily equal (in proportion) or
opposite (as it may be asymmetric).
Insight 4: Smart Power is Smart Strategy.
Terrorists and criminal elements challenge the legitimacy and sovereignty of the current order through
violent extremism and other destabilizing means. Since
the advent of al-Qaeda, Islamist extremists have become increasingly transnational and, in many cases, indistinguishable from local and regional criminal orga-
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nizations. As much as they reject it, they are a product
of globalization and will continue to exploit the many
benefits brought by these profitable synergies. It is almost certain that a diaspora from the Middle East conflicts will reignite jihadist fires in the Indo-Asia-Pacific,
and they will be more sophisticated than ever.
In dealing with this burgeoning threat, it will be
important to distinguish between terrorism and terrorists and employ “smart power.” Strategically, it is
more important to counter terrorism and mitigate its
root causes than to defeat individual terrorists. Policy and decisionmakers are quick to declare that “we
never negotiate with terrorists.”75 A recent RAND
study shows that, in fact, we do negotiate with terrorist leadership, and in most cases, we must—it is
an important part of reducing the incidence (and the
scale) of conflict—which is often achieved through a
negotiated political solution.76 The rub is finding the
right blend of offensive and defensive (but not necessarily military) actions, which weaken terrorism and
draw the terrorists into nonviolent engagement within
legitimate political processes.
Smart power is the combined use of hard and soft
power.77 Smart power is conceptually elegant, but admittedly difficult to achieve. It is also a key aspect of
America’s Global Strategy.78 To defeat violent extremists and transnational criminal organizations, the intelligent application of smart power is required. Undermining such adversaries demands the employment of
smart strategies which demonstrate strategic patience,
build partner capacity, and defeat specific threats with
agility and precision while supporting civilian governance, legitimate law enforcement, and national
sovereignty. Deterrence must be matched with robust
collective assurance. To achieve this, “civil-military
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cooperation” needs to replace “joint operations” as the
bywords for teamwork.
Insight 5: It Pays to be Prepared.
The disaster in Dhaka is a glimpse of the scale of
human adversity coming to the PACOM AOR. While
the region currently experiences widespread disasters,
the magnitude of human suffering will dramatically
increase. In 2025, there are likely to be 23 megacities,79
with over 430 million Asian city dwellers at risk of
coastal flooding and 350 million urban Asians at risk of
inland flooding.80 The urbanization of the population
and insufficient infrastructure in areas prone to devastating natural disasters, and the increasing impact of
climate change are a recipe for humanitarian crises on
an unprecedented scale. Eradicating the threat of disaster is not possible. A comprehensive strategy to mitigate and manage disasters as they occur is required. To
have a better chance of achieving this, governments,
international organizations, NGOs, and other partners
must plan ahead collaboratively. Only by paying a prudent premium for preparedness (collaboration, coordination, training, infrastructure research, and design) up
front, will the downstream costs of chaos, governance
upheaval, counterproductive responses, and human
tragedy be reduced.81
Insight 6: “Mistrust” Causes the
Nightmare Scenario.
Full-scale Sino-U.S. conflict is the Pacific nightmare,
ultimately borne of mistrust and misunderstanding
between the two great powers. “Trust is important for
international cooperative endeavors, but the neglect
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of distrust is not appropriate when national security
or global peace are at stake.”82 In this context, “mistrust” describes a miscalculation in the trust/distrust
balance. To avoid the Pacific nightmare, it is important to increasingly advance trust-related behavior
between China and the United States. This includes
consistent cooperation (working together on “smaller”
issues makes it easier to collaborate on larger ones
later), informal agreements, accepting influence, and
transacting transparent business.
The Air-Sea Battle Concept is not intended to be
viewed through the lens of a particular scenario or adversary, such as the defense of Taiwan against China.83
Rather, it is designed to “set the conditions at the operational level to sustain a stable, favorable conventional military balance throughout the Western Pacific
region.”84 Yet, despite any rhetoric to the contrary, the
United States is executing a significant strategic pivot
to the PACOM AOR and is aggressively resourcing its
military to counter capabilities that are primarily possessed or being pursued by China. Through the eyes
of the Chinese, recent U.S. actions may be viewed as a
revival of a Cold War strategy of containment, a perception that undermines our desire to foster a climate
of stability and trust with China.85 To help offset the
negative effects of this military concept (arms races and
mistrust), our approach must be complemented and
reinforced with a strategy of assurance and collaboration (partnerships on human security, building resilient
livable cities, empowering people and economies, reinforcing people-to-people linkages, and the cooperative
use of security forces).
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Air-Sea Battle is also designed to “deter China from
acts of aggression or coercion in that region and, if necessary, to respond effectively in the event deterrence
fails.”86 While weapons systems such as aircraft carriers
and stealth bombers are the backbone of our Naval and
Air Forces, the United States must continually scrutinize strategies to reveal and overcome their vulnerabilities. A thinking and constantly evolving adversary may
compel us to seek entirely different approaches, which
may not include our most coveted weapons systems.
We must be open to the possibility that the weapons,
which define our strengths in one scenario, become our
weaknesses in another.
CONCLUSION: A BETTER WAY—SECURITY
THROUGH COLLECTIVE ASSURANCE AND
UNDERSTANDING
Given the scale, complexity, and geographical attributes of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, the stakes of
“getting it right” are unprecedentedly high. The strategic observations presented in the sixth and final dream
suggest: (1) understanding the complexity of the PACOM AOR; (2) institutionalizing a culture of collaboration between agencies, organizations and nations; (3)
planning for second order and unintended effects; (4)
building meaningful trust; and (5) employing smart
power and civil military cooperation. Considering
and responding to these observations will best enable
regional stability and equip Indo-Asia-Pacific nations
to manage effectively emerging crises. Similarly, while
sovereign power politics are undoubtedly a significant influence, human security is increasingly important and will become more so in the coming decades.
The meaningful pursuit of smart power and collective
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assurance to address human security and mitigate human suffering is imperative. We also must take a hard
look at whether current U.S. policies and strategies in
the region will achieve their desired effects. Military
concepts like Air-Sea Battle certainly have their value,
but the consequences of such actions must be understood in the broader context. Deterrence, alone, is arguably counterproductive in this environment. For
the majority of the world’s humanity who live in the
PACOM AOR, success will likely be measured by the
stability and prosperity obtained under legitimate civil
governance, not military victory. True success will require a better way—regional security through collective assurance and understanding. See Picture 16.

Picture 16. Collective Assurance.
Fundamentally, there are four major systemic pressures that need to be stabilized. State competition seeks
to reorder the system, violent extremists seek to over
throw the system, illegal competitors seek to subvert
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the system for pecuniary advantage, and, finally, natural forces have the potential to overwhelm the system.
To manage these threats, security partners need to act
collectively across a broad spectrum to provide collective assurance to the peoples, nations, and environment of the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
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